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Abstract: This paper reflects on a seminal work in the history of AI and representation: Rodney Brooks’1
1991 paper Intelligence without Representation. Brooks advocated the removal of explicit representations2
and engineered environments from the domain of his robotic intelligence experimentation, in favour3
of an evolutionary-inspired approach using layers of reactive behaviour that operated independently4
of each other. Brooks criticised the current progress in AI research and believed that removing5
complex representation from AI would help address problematic areas in modelling the mind. His6
belief was that we should develop artificial intelligence by being guided by evolutionary development7
of our own intelligence, and that his approach mirrored how our own intelligence functions. Thus8
the field of behaviour-based robotics emerged. This paper offers a historical analysis of Brooks’9
behaviour-based robotics approach and its impact in artificial intelligence and cognitive theory at the10
time, as well as in modern-day approaches to AI.11
Keywords: behaviour-based robotics; representation; adaptive behaviour; evolutionary robotics12
1. Introduction13
In 1991 Rodney Brooks published the paper Intelligence without Representation: a seminal work in14
behaviour-based robotics [1]. This paper influenced many aspects of research into artificial intelligence15
and cognitive theory.16
In Intelligence without Representation Brooks described his behaviour-based robotics approach to17
artificial intelligence. He highlighted a number of points that he considers fundamental in modelling18
intelligence. These ideas were controversial and triggered much debate. Brooks was advocating the19
removal of explicit representations and engineered environments from the domain of his robotic20
intelligence experimentation. This was in stark contrast to traditional approaches to AI, which Brooks21
attacked in this paper, as well as contrasting with many modern-day approaches to AI.22
Whilst Brooks’ views have inspired similar research by a number of his contemporaries, and23
brought about the research area of behaviour-based robotics as well as inspiring other research areas,24
his ideas were controversial and he also has many critics who do not accept the validity of what he25
proposes. Nevertheless Brooks has impacted research in artificial intelligence and cognitive science26
since 1991. He presents a distinct view on how we can use artificial intelligence techniques to model27
and understand our own intelligence.28
2. The state of Artificial Intelligence research prior to 1991, as the context for Intelligence without29
Representation30
The two prominent schools of thought in Artificial intelligence (AI) prior to the publication of31
Intelligence without Representation were (i) traditional AI (also referred to as symbolic AI, logical AI, Good32
Old Fashioned AI (GOFAI) or classical AI) and (ii) connectionism (also referred to as neural networks).33
Traditional AI was the most prevalent approach at the time of writing Intelligence without Representation34
[1].35
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Brooks’ critical comments on the failures of AI research to date were mainly addressed at36
traditional AI, although his criticisms also included connectionism, which was coming back into37
active research after developments in the 1970s. Although there is little in common between these38
two approaches, they are widely regarded as both being derived from the same original source of39
McCullogh and Pitts’ work this was not always the case; for example the seminal work by McCullogh40
and Pitts on a neuronal approach to logic-based AI [reference updated] [2] influenced both traditional41
AI and connectionism [3].42
To understand the AI environment which contextualises [1]: the aim of traditional AI at this time43
was to demonstrate how the processing of information can be done in an intelligent manner; generally44
efforts are focused on carrying out specific tasks or solving problems in specialised domains. The45
information being processed was represented in such a way that computation can be performed to46
create a solution. This would be done by performing manipulation of some symbolic format of the47
problem domain, for example Hayes suggested the use of first-order logic [4]. This manipulation is48
referred to as the physical symbol system hypothesis [5], with the symbolic manipulation centrally49
controlled by some supervisory process. The manipulation of a representation of a problem domain50
for intelligence can be seen today in knowledge representation research examples for contemporary51
robotics such as KnowRob and RoboEarth (see [6]), as well as in areas such as data mining and statistical52
machine learning algorithms.53
Connectionism, on the other hand, was more biologically-inspired, taking as its model what we54
know about the architecture of the human brain. The concept behind connectionism was that if we55
construct an inter-connected network of units similar to the neural units that we believe the brain56
is constructed of, then we can construct an intelligent system that functions as the brain does. One57
can trace modern day research in deep learning, neural networks and cognitive neuroscience back to58
connectionist roots.59
The overreaching contemporary goal for artificial intelligence as viewed by many commentators60
was to replicate human intelligence in a computational system [5,7,8].1 Brooks strongly criticised the61
general state of AI research at that time [1,8], commenting that research was not advancing towards this62
goal as it should, and was too specialised into sub-disciplines such as planning or logical reasoning.263
He argued that our lack of sufficient understanding of human intelligence prevents us from being able64
to partition AI effectively into specialisms that could be recombined in the future:65
“No one talks about replicating the full gamut of human intelligence any more. Instead66
we see a retreat into specialized subproblems ... Amongst the dreamers still in the field of67
AI ... there is a feeling that one day all these pieces will all fall into place and we will see68
“truly” intelligent systems emerge.69
However I, and others, believe that human level intelligence is too complex and little70
understood to be correctly decomposed into the right subpieces at the moment.” [1, p. 140]71
He believed that traditional AI research efforts addresses the wrong type of intelligent behaviour72
and quoted evolutionary timescales to support this view. For example, it took 5000 years to develop73
the art of writing: only a tiny fraction of the 3.5 billion years it took to develop the essence of74
“being and reacting” [1]. Given this evolutionary precedent, Brooks believed that the proportion of75
research in specialised areas such as computational linguistics and natural language processing is76
disproportionately large and that we should instead be concentrating our efforts on modelling more77
simple intelligent behaviour.78
A powerful analogy used in [1] is that of artificial flight. He hypothesised about a group of79
artificial flight researchers of the 1890s (before aeroplanes were invented). These researchers are80
1 See concluding remarks to see how this definition has evolved since.
2 Certainly AI was not progressing as hoped for: Turing expected his test of intelligence [9] to have been passed by the end of
the twentieth century; however at the time of writing the Turing test still has not been passed.
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transported in time to travel on an aeroplane in the 1980s. Given this glimpse of how artificial flight81
is real and possible, on their return they work on replicating the aircraft of the 1980s, exactly as they82
have seen, but with only their own limited knowledge to guide them.83
His point is that modern day AI researchers are similar to these artificial flight researchers from84
the 1890s, in that they are trying to reconstruct the example of their work in practice that they have85
seen working successfully, with insufficient basic knowledge about the underlying foundations of their86
work. In other words, AI researchers in 1991 are working without sufficient knowledge of how our87
intelligence is developed from basic levels (like that demonstrated by insects, for example).88
There is some precursor to Brooks’ views in the discussion of the successes and failures of AI.89
Dreyfus and Dreyfus constructed a critical review of early work in Artificial Intelligence, up until the90
time of writing [10]. They judged that traditional AI has been found wanting and has not made the91
achievements in explaining and modelling the mind that it should. Hubert Dreyfus had previously92
argued [11] that intelligence could not be generated by symbol manipulation and that AI research was93
weakened by its reliance on Newell and Simon’s physical symbol system hypothesis and felt that this94
argument had not been countered yet.95
“The physical symbol system approach seems to be failing because it is simply false to96
assume that there must be a theory of every domain.” [10, p. 330]97
Drew McDermott, previously a key exponent of logical AI, also described how he was now98
drawn more to an approach which discards deduction as the sole implementation of the thinking99
processes [12]. As McDermott still made use of knowledge representation, his approach in [12] was100
not as extreme a departure from traditional AI as Brooks’s was. However this public shift in views101
from a prominent traditional AI researcher was indicative of problems in the traditional paradigm,102
particularly as McDermott expresses concern that a large proportion of AI research thus far may be103
leading to results that are of no use. McDermott admitted in [12] that his own research using this104
new approach in had not been overly fruitful and that he had been forced to retreat from this new105
viewpoint in his practical work, but he expressed confidence that once given proper investigation, this106
new “territory” could provide AI research with interesting new results. His later research, however,107
moved towards Semantic Web ontology research: an area emphasising significant use of knowledge108
modelling and representation.109
Still, prominent voices were criticising traditional symbolic AI as a means of explaining human110
intelligence sufficiently. Therefore when Brooks’ views were published, although controversial, they111
had been given some foundation in philosophical AI literature.112
It might be surprising to learn that Brooks’ academic background half a decade prior to publishing113
Intelligence without Representation (and similar papers) was rooted in symbolic AI. He wrote several114
papers in the early 1980s on work in planning, representation-based models and symbolic reasoning115
and analysis.3 Brooks discusses in a 1997 interview with the Edge Foundation how the complexity116
of the mathematical models he was creating in his earlier career led him to the conclusion that the117
symbolic approach was not the right way to explain how intelligence worked.118
“It just couldn’t be right. We had a very complex mathematical approach, but that couldn’t119
be what was going on with animals moving their limbs about. Look at an insect, it can fly120
around and navigate with just a hundred thousand neurons. It can’t be doing this very121
complex symbolic mathematical computations. There must be something different going on.”122
[14]123
3 It is interesting to note that although Brooks includes these publications in his list of publications on his academic profile
[13], none of the symbolic AI papers are linked to full texts of the paper (though the full texts are accessible from other
sources), whereas the vast majority of his papers post 1985 do have links. Brooks is acknowledging the existence of those
papers but is disassociating himself from the contents of his earlier publications
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It was this realisation that caused his change in perspective. From the mid 1980s onwards Brooks124
worked on developing this line of thought. This was to lead to the publication of Intelligence without125
Representation in 1991.126
3. Fundamental aspects of Intelligence without Representation127
3.1. Discarding Representation in favour of physical embodiment in the real-world environment128
As suggested by the title of Intelligence without Representation, the hypothesis Brooks presented in129
1991 is that:130
“Representation is the wrong unit of abstraction in building the bulkiest parts of intelligent131
systems” [1, p.140]132
Brooks advocated that explicit central representations, “representation of goals that some central133
(or distributed) process selects from” [1][p. 144], are unnecessary to intelligence. Indeed they may even134
form a barrier to the demonstration of the mind’s intelligence: as computations on representational135
symbols become more complex they take longer to process, hence Brooks’ robots performed well136
compared to other contemporary robots in dynamic environments, because they could react in real-time137
without needing lengthy computational time. Brooks found during his own robotics experimentation138
that it is “better to use the world as its own model” [1, p. 140].139
The behaviour-based robotics approach (also referred to by Brooks as Nouvelle AI in Brooks [8]140
requires that intelligence is demonstrated through our actions and interactions with the world. Critical141
to this is that the environment within which the robot operates must be independent of the robot142
design. It must not be simplified or targeted towards assisting the robot in any way. Instead the robot143
must be able to perform appropriate active and reactive behaviour to any environment it is put in.144
As demonstration of this principle, one of Brooks’ more famous intelligent robots (which he refers145
to as “Creatures”) was Herbert, which operated in the MIT labs with the specific task of picking up146
drink cans. The lab environment is ever-changing, particularly when new people come to watch the147
robots operate. So Herbert would constantly need to react to new elements around it, working in148
real-time. Herbert was equipped with a small number of sensors and a mechanical arm that could149
grasp objects. Simple behaviours such as the ability to ‘wander’ around were enabled using infra-red150
and laser sensors to navigate corridors and doors, to follow walls and avoid obstacles, as they were151
encountered. Herbert’s sensors could also detect objects available to be grasped by its arm. [15].152
Herbert was illustrative of the initial success of Brooks’ approach. In comparison, existing153
traditional AI robots at that time relied on being located in a static environment, a space which they154
would probably hold an internal representation of. For example, one could imagine that for a ‘GOFAI155
Herbert’ to solve the specific task of picking up drink cans in the MIT labs, it would require an internal156
representation of the MIT labs and objects in the labs. Movements would be calculated based on157
processing incoming input against that representation. Extra computation may be required on the158
occasions when input did not match what was expected given the robot’s internal representations.159
Though this GOFAI Herbert is hypothetical rather than realised, generally in practice one could see160
how it might follow the pattern Brooks was observing: that compared to robots like Herbert, traditional161
AI robots and exhibited very little movement compared to processing time [14].162
It is important to clarify what, in Brooks’ eyes, constitutes a representation, so we understand163
precisely what Brooks is rejecting.4 Brooks did not directly define the term ‘representation’ in164
Intelligence without Representation, but he did describe what he sees as a “good representation” [1,165
p. 140] for AI:166
4 As noted by a reviewer of this paper, “this failure to define the term “representation” fuels a lot of discussion in cognitive
science. This implies that the term is not intuitively precise and that it means different things to different people. ”
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“The idea was that by representing only the pertinent facts explicitly, the semantics of a167
world (which on the surface was quite complex) were reduced to a simple closed system168
once again. Abstraction to only the relevant details thus simplified the problems.” [1, p. 140]169
As an illustrative example, Brooks gave the following representation of a chair:170
“(CAN (SIT-ON PERSON CHAIR)), (CAN (STAND-ON PERSON CHAIR)) ” [1, p. 140]171
According to Brooks, a “standard representation” (i.e. a traditional AI representation) is composed172
of “variables ... that need instantiation in reasoning processes. ... rules which need to be selected173
through pattern matching. ... choices to be made” [1, p. 145]. Brooks rejected “traditional AI174
representations ... tokens which have any semantics that can be attached to them. ” [1, p. 144].175
Later, in [16], Brooks clarified his interpretation of representations as “an abstract manipulable176
entity” [p. 8], “[i]nternal world models which are complete representations of the external environment”177
[p. 3], that “rely on a semantic correspondence with symbols that the agent possesses” [p. 3]:178
“The common view in Artificial Intelligence, and particularly in the knowledge179
representation community, is that there is a central storage system which links together180
the information about concepts, individuals, categories, goals, intentions, desires, and181
whatever else might be needed by the system. In particular there is a tendency to believe182
that the knowledge is stored in a way that is independent from the way or circumstances183
in which it was acquired.” [16, p. 14]184
“Over the years within traditional Artificial Intelligence, it has become accepted that185
they will need an objective model of the world with individuated entities, tracked and186
identified over time—the models of knowledge representation that have been developed187
expect and require such a one-to-one correspondence between the world and the agent’s188
representation of it.” [16, p. 16]189
Brooks also used [16] to restate more clearly his position regarding representations, making it190
clear that he was not advocating for the entire removal of all representations of the environment that a191
robot operates in:192
“My earlier paper [Intelligence without Representation] is often criticized for advocating193
absolutely no representation of the world within a behavior-based robot. This criticism194
is invalid. I make it clear in the paper that I reject traditional Artificial Intelligence195
representation schemes (see section 5). I also made it clear that I reject explicit196
representations of goals within the machine. There can, however, be representations197
which are partial models of the world” [16, p. 21]198
3.2. Subsumption architecture and emergent behaviour199
The subsumption architecture reported by [1] for Brooks’ robots is a modular structure composed200
of layers of simple behaviour such as WANDER or AVOID OBSTACLES. These layers co-exist201
independently and interact only as a side effect of their co-existence, rather than directly intending to202
communicate between layers. There is no central control of the layers or any symbol passing between203
layers; they operate independently of one another.204
Emergentism, or emergent behaviour, is key to how the layers of Brooks’ subsumption architecture205
operate in parallel to demonstrate intelligent behaviour. Brooks took Herb Simon’s observation [17]206
of an ant walking across sand as an example of complex behaviour emerging from the combination207
of simple behaviours of an ant’s movement reacting to a complex environment. Brooks suggested208
complex behaviour in intelligent creatures is more a result of complexity in the environment rather209
than in the intelligent creature. So complex behavioural patterns can emerge when simple behaviours210
combine together and are situated in an environment.211
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The incremental nature of Brooks’ robots means that successful behaviours are retained in future.212
New robots are developments of older robots: they have the same behaviour of older robots except213
that they have additional layers in their subsumption architecture (this is instead of constructing a214
completely new architecture for each new robot).215
Brooks attributed much of his inspiration to evolutionary precedents. Evolution involves a great216
deal of ‘trial and error’, where organisms with the more successful developments flourished whilst217
other organisms struggled to survive. In past reflections [18], Brooks has described how his research218
methods take a similar direction:219
“We don’t have any plans! [for our robots] These are all research robots built experimentally220
... patch upon patch upon kludge.”221
The successful ‘patches’ and ‘kludges’ survive and are retained, with new ‘patches’ added as the222
research develops.223
4. Explaining cognitive processes through Brooks’ approach: How does this differ to other AI224
approaches?225
“AI can help us understand the mind - what it is, as well as how it works.” [7]226
“Computational studies, investigating similar problems being solved in a mind-body227
complex, help develop a more rigorous model and, more importantly, provide an228
understanding of the flow of information in and between these processes.” [19]229
The above two quotes are indicative of the commonly held view that AI research is a valuable tool230
in explaining how the mind works. Andy Clark describes how our mental processes are envisaged by231
proponents of traditional AI and of connectionism:232
“Classicists believe that thinking just is the manipulation of items having propositional233
or logical form; connectionists insist that this is just the icing on the cake and that thinking234
(‘deep’ thinking, rather than just sentence rehearsal) depends on the manipulation of235
quite different structure. As a result, the classicist attempts to give a level 2 processing236
model which is defined over the very same kinds of structure as figure in her level 1237
theory.5 Whereas the connectionist insists on dissolving that structure and replacing it with238
something quite different.239
A curious irony emerges. In the early days of Artificial Intelligence, the rallying cry240
was ‘Computers do not crunch numbers, they manipulate symbols’. This was meant to241
inspire a doubting public by showing how much computation was like thinking. Now the242
wheel has come full circle. The virtue of connectionist systems, it seems, is that ‘they do243
not manipulate symbols, they crunch numbers’. And nowadays we all know (don’t we?)244
that thinking is not mere symbol manipulation! So the wheel turns.” [21, p. 306]245
Brooks, on the other hand, believes that thinking is an emergent phenomenon that arises as a246
result of different behavioural layers interacting with each other. His approach could be said to form a247
new Kuhnian paradigm in artificial intelligence and cognitive science. He treated traditional AI and248
connectionism as the normal science within which researchers are encountering difficulties such as the249
symbol-grounding problem or the frame problem. Behaviour-based robotics is the revolutionary science250
5 This is a reference to Marr’s 3-level cognitive model of information processing [20]. Level 1, the computational level, looks at
what a system does, what functions it performs, and why. Level 2, the algorithmic level, looks at how a system operates, and
the representations and processes it employs. Level 3, not mentioned here, looks at the physical realisation of the system,
and is perhaps the most relatable to Brooks’ ideas (though by no means an accurate one-to-one mapping). Clark is making
the point that, in contrast to a connectionist’s perspective, someone from a classicist (traditional AI) perspective treats how
we think (level 2) in terms of what functions may be occurring (level 1).
Version September 1, 2020 submitted to Systems 7 of 18
that Brooks presented as a new and more accurate paradigm that AI research needs to shift to in order251
to make any real further progress [22].252
It is worth looking at Brooks’ arguments on how behaviour-based robotics deals with the253
symbol-grounding problem and the frame problem. In his the Chinese Room analogy [23], Searle254
described how intelligence cannot be attained purely through manipulating symbols, (the prevalent255
attitude in symbolic AI). Instead these symbols should be “grounded” in some way so that they256
are given semantic validity. It is only when there is some meaning to the symbols that guides the257
manipulation of the symbols, that any such process could be considered as showing intelligent258
behaviour.6259
This symbol grounding problem - defining the actual semantics or referential meaning of the260
computation performed by intelligent systems - was of major concern to symbolic AI practitioners. To261
Brooks and his supporters, however, this problem is essentially solved by behaviour-based robotics262
as a matter of course, by basing the robots in a real-world environment and using the surrounding263
environment to guide its actions rather than representations of the environment. Brooks believes that264
the symbol-grounding issue does in fact demonstrate how his behaviour-based approach addresses265
one of the fundamental weaknesses of traditional AI and connectionism [1,8].266
Another classical problem in symbolic AI is known as the frame problem. If the world that the267
intelligent system operates in is given some form of representation, then the intelligent system has to268
deal with monitoring changes in the environment and incorporating these in the representation. Also269
any aspects of the environment that have not been encoded representationally may cause the intelligent270
system problems. As Brooks’ earliest robots have shown, behaviour-based robotics encounter little271
difficulty when dealing with dynamic environments because they are embodied within the real world272
and interact with the world in real-time rather than abstracting a model representation of the world.273
For any intelligent system to be deemed a proper model of the mind, it is necessary to define274
the criteria by which the system is being judged. A fundamental tenet of Brooks’ theory is that the275
workings of the mind are demonstrated through intelligent behaviour. Hence the behaviour of his276
robots is indicative of the workings of an artificial mind.277
Another key point for Brooks is that the human mind is not the only source of intelligence; other278
organisms also demonstrate intelligence which is worth modelling. He is very clear on this point.279
Human cognition can be extremely complex. Brooks described human-level cognition as “the holy280
grail of AI” and concedes that as of 1990:281
“neither classical nor nouvelle [behaviour-based] AI seem close to revealing the secrets of282
the holy grail of AI, namely general purpose human level intelligence equivalence” [8, p. 4]283
It is plain that Brooks believes his Nouvelle AI to be the correct way in which to achieve this goal.284
As an anti-representationalist, Brooks believes we do not need to rely on representation, instead285
we should gradually develop our intelligent systems, one step at a time. If the human mind developed286
through an incremental process such as this, then there is no wisdom in pursuing methods which287
require fresh representations to be constructed at each step [1,8,14].288
Brooks also had issues with the level of complexity necessary to model some facets of the mind:289
“Symbol systems in their purest forms assume a knowable objective truth. It is only290
with much complexity that modal logics, or non-monotonic logics, can be built which better291
enable a system to have beliefs gleaned from partial views of a chaotic world.292
As these enhancements are made, the realization of computations based on these formal293
systems becomes more and more biologically implausible. But once the commitment to294
6 And even then, Searle says this is only Weak AI, or the simulation of intelligence, rather than the demonstration of true
intelligence itself.
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symbol systems has been made it is imperative to push on through more and more complex295
and cumbersome systems in pursuit of objectivity.” [8, p. 4]296
Brooks’ solution to this problem of complication and complexity was to eradicate the symbol297
systems and embrace a more biologically inspired, more simple methodology. His theories that there298
is no place for mental representations while performing intelligent behaviour have been preceded by299
similar observations. For example Dreyfus and Dreyfus described Wittgenstein’s statements that our300
mental systems do not have entities within them that correspond to a singular thought or idea [10],301
and Gibson made the case that perception has no use for mental representations [24]. More recently,302
Harvey has warned of the need for ‘linguistic hygiene’ when using terms such as ‘representation’,303
arguing that while representations can be usefully studied in AI and cognitive science, there is much304
to be gained from a ‘minimal cognition’ approach which builds only the minimal model of cognition305
necessary to achieve the desired behaviour [25].306
There is further criticism of the application of traditional AI as a model of our own intelligence.307
This criticism is based around the level of assistance traditional AI systems could be said to receive.308
Brooks believed that as of 1991 our efforts at building intelligent systems were misguided, in that we309
were providing the intelligent systems with too much of our own intelligence as assistance instead of310
getting the systems to demonstrate true intelligence.311
“Under the current scheme the abstraction is done by the researchers leaving little for the AI312
programs to do but search.” [1, p. 143]313
His point here was that the truly intelligent tasks are not undertaken and that researchers assist314
their systems too much; this is help which our own intelligence systems did not have when developing.315
Hence Brooks was very critical of the performance of existing AI methods thus far; artificial intelligence,316
he argued, was not true intelligence at all, but merely “simple numeric computations carried out in the317
sea of symbols”. [8, p. 5]318
A key point that Brooks emphasised7 was the generality of intelligent behaviour. Our minds do319
not just focus on one task at a time. Even if our attention is drawn to one task that we are concentrating320
on, our minds are concurrently managing several other tasks at once. For example if a person is321
concentrating on reading a book, their mind will be simultaneously managing many other tasks such322
as holding the book, sitting in a chair, comprehending any conversation that is made to that person,323
and so on.324
Brooks’ strong criticism of traditional AI is that there is too much focus on building systems which325
are specialised for particular tasks or functions.326
“In classical AI, none of the modules themselves generate the behavior of the total system.327
Indeed it is necessary to combine together many of the modules to get any behavior at all328
from the system. ” [8, p. 3]329
He went on to say present his opinion that such a combination of classical AI modules is likely to330
present some difficulty because of the specialised way in which they have been designed [1].331
Traditional AI and connectionism have been much maligned for having shortcomings, however332
they are not totally without benefit. Boden considered the key advantages of symbolic AI to be its333
representational ordering structure and clear definitions of problems to be solved and associated334
constraints [26]. In contrast, she saw the benefits of using a connectionist approach to be their335
biologically more plausible basis, trainability and ‘gradual degradation’ (should parts of the system336
stop working, the whole system does not suffer: the performance is reduced rather than completely337
halted).338
But which approach is superior? It is time to take a closer look at Brooks’ theory.339
7 And still emphasises - see the discussions later in this paper on Brooks’ impact on and opinions of modern-day AI research.
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5. Discussion of Brooks’ approach340
Hayes et al. raised some interesting counter-arguments to Brooks’ views [27]. They made no341
secret of their belief that representations are very useful for modelling mental processes and should342
not be discarded. They used a ‘nannies and babies’ metaphor throughout their article to illustrate this.343
They did not deny that intelligent agents should be able to operate in and react to a social environment344
(situated AI), but they made a very strong claim about the nature of agents that do so without using345
some form of representation of that environment, concluding that such an approach may even cast346
doubts on the very validity of scientific method:347
“This perspective has its intellectual roots in parts of recent sociological thinking which reject348
the entire fabric of western science.” [27]349
The authors of [27] recognised that traditional AI does show flaws that need to be addressed,350
and agreed that there is a need for getting the basic foundations of cognitive theory correct. (One351
of the authors, Patrick Hayes, co-authored work with John McCarthy on philosophical problems352
within AI, including an early identification of the frame problem [28]. For people such as Brooks,353
though, who suggest modelling intelligence from a completely different theoretical perspective in354
order to solve these problems, Hayes et al. were critical, using the adage “Don’t throw the baby out355
with the bathwater” [27]. They accused such people of ignoring crucial developments in modelling356
the mind (giving planning as an example), and of condemning these developments as unworthy of357
retention, in their haste to follow new cognitive theories. This was an emphatic attack on Brooks and358
his contemporaries, but perhaps it makes more extreme conclusions than is deserved, in its attempt to359
provoke reaction.360
Some have questioned whether behaviour-based robots do actually rely on representations in an361
inferential form without being explicitly coded (for example [29]). Brooks anticipated such suggestions362
and dismissed them with the comments that:363
“There are no variables ... that need instantiation in reasoning processes. There are no rules364
which need to be selected through pattern matching. There are no choices to be made. To a365
large extent the state of the world determines the action of the Creature” [1, p. 149]366
So Brooks firmly advocated that he has not used any form of representation-based methods. This367
is however still open to much debate, as has been seen in the literature (for example [29,30]).368
It must be questioned whether symbolic representation is as limited as Brooks describes. Brooks369
does have experience in working in symbolic AI prior to his shift in thinking, and described many370
problems that he ran into that he described as a direct consequence of using representation to explain371
how the mind works. However it is generally conceded, as a result of [23] and similar writing (for372
example [27, pp. 17-20], that intelligence is not purely just about the rigid manipulation of symbols,373
but requires some guidance from knowledge of the semantics behind the symbols. Some forms of374
intelligence modelling do have a more simplified use of knowledge representation (in fact Hayes et al.375
imply that these include the research that Brooks was part of in the early 1980s [27, p. 17]). Proponents376
of symbolic AI argued that knowledge representation is far more flexible and less restricted than such377
simplified systems would suggest. For example, advances have been made employing representation378
learning, such as in learning object affordances [31,32] or state information [33]. This debate on the379
validity of symbolic representation of knowledge for cognitive purposes has been in progress since the380
publication of Brooks’ ideas and, with current interests in representations for robotics (e.g. [6]) as well381
as more generally in areas such as data mining, does not look close to resolution.382
Whilst discussing cognitive science models that are embodied, having physical presence, [34],383
Andy Clark made a valid observation concerning Brooks’ assertion that a behaviour-based robot shows384
intelligent behaviour if it carries out some reactive behaviour that is helpful to the survival of the robot.385
Clark described how a sunflower will react to the changes in positioning of the sun by changing the386
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direction in which it faces, in order to maximise the exposure to the sun it receives [34, p. 347]. The387
question is whether this is a demonstration of intelligent cognition and behaviour by the sunflower.388
The natural reaction to this is that a sunflower does not carry out any rational thought process, so389
it cannot be demonstrating intelligence. However by strict interpretation of Brooks’ assertions, this390
sunflower would be considered intelligent. Clearly this aspect of Brooks’ theory could benefit from391
clarification, particularly on what constitutes intelligent behaviour.8392
In his critical response to [1], Etzioni made some interesting points in direct reference to the393
evolutionary influence that Brooks gives as justification for his methods [35]. Etzioni quoted the394
theory of punctuated equilibria which states that evolutionary development is not necessarily linearly395
proportional to the time taken but may include a high amount of variance. There may be little or396
no progress for a large amount of time, followed by a rush of new breakthroughs. Etzioni used this397
to questions Brooks’ basis in evolutionary development of intelligence. Essentially he was asking if398
Brooks is selecting only the aspects of evolution that are useful for his argument, as for the example399
above with the comparison of timescales of different evolutionary developments. Etzioni asked exactly400
how Brooks has derived the conclusion that higher level cognition will follow on naturally from simple401
reactive robotics. He suggested that an equally valid conclusion could be drawn in the same way as402
Brooks’ conclusion, that if AI researchers work towards developing the hardware of actual organisms,403
that the intelligent aspects of the mind will follow naturally [35, p. 9]. It is an interesting observation404
and not one that Brooks has chosen to answer, as far as I have been able to find.405
The evolutionary justification used by Brooks also does not fully account for other decisions406
Brooks made within his approach. Behaviour-based robotics emphasises the building of simple407
robots at first, only adding complexity when the simpler robots have been successfully achieved.408
Brooks advocated this in [1], but argued that it is not right to have the same approach to the robots’409
environments (the use of simple environments at first, with complexity added incrementally). He410
justified this with the argument that evolution has proven the first approach to be successful, but that411
the second approach could mean that errors were inadvertently introduced [1] (in particular p. 150). I412
see, however, two problems with this argument. Firstly, as Brooks himself acknowledges:413
“As a very approximate hand waving model of evolution, things get built up and accreted414
over time, and maybe new accretions interfere with the lower levels.” [14]415
So Brooks concedes that his methods introduce unexpected behaviour which may not be a desired416
result (as is the nature of systems that make use of emergentism). Even if not regarded as errors, these417
unexpected behaviours are still a source of uncertainty.9418
Also, Brooks did not consider that our environments have developed in complexity as we have419
evolved. As the human race10 has evolved, our environments have received increasingly more complex420
adaptations as we become more technologically advanced: from the invention of the wheel to modern421
day transport systems and beyond. Also, as infants our environments are necessarily restricted by our422
parents or carers. Complexity is added as we are gradually exposed to more of the world. It is not423
considered plausible that a baby would be able to cope with a real-world environment in the way that424
a grown adult has learnt to; their world is controlled and simplified for them. It is to be supposed that425
Neolithic man in the modern-day world would have similar difficulties to the baby. However Brooks426
disregarded these aspects of human development and evolution in [1].427
The emergent behaviour demonstrated by Brooks’ robots was shown to be successful for relatively428
small tasks such as collection of drinks cans or map navigation - lower-level cognitive processes [36].429
A common comment, however, is that designing a task-driven system which produces emergent430
8 But Brooks’ emphasis is on research of a implementional nature rather than theorising so it is unlikely he would enter into
much philosophical debate about his approach. Instead Brooks offers his robots as direct evidence of his theory.
9 Uncertainty may, of course, be no bad thing.
10 As a reviewer of this article notes, arguably this argument could be extended to animals as well.
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behaviour is a hard task due to the element of uncertainty in prediction of emergent behaviour (for431
example [30], or even Brooks himself [37]). ; rather than designing for a particular desired behaviour,432
an emergent system’s behaviour develops over time. Following on from Brooks’ own criticisms433
that we do not understand intelligence well enough to subdivide it into specialised sub-problems, a434
similar criticism could be levelled at Brooks’ subsumption architecture design: do we know enough435
about emergentism to develop the correct layers of behaviour such that some required behaviour will436
emerge? And how do we know we have included all necessary layers in our design, if we cannot437
identify what these layers should be?438
It is doubtful that Brooks would attach too much significance to these criticisms, from his previous439
comments:440
“Nouvelle AI relies on the emergence of more global behavior from the interaction of smaller441
behavioral units. As with heuristics there is no a priori guarantee that this will always work.442
However, careful design of the simple behaviors and their interactions can often produce443
systems with useful and interesting emergent properties.” [1]444
Indeed, to respond to these criticisms, one might point out that behaviour-based robotics is445
an evolutionary and incremental process of development where each new layer of behaviour gives446
the robot more complex intelligent behaviour. Rather than aiming for a target level of intelligent447
behaviour for a given task, we should be developing the robots’ intelligence in a step-by-step manner,448
gradually increasing in complexity and generality. This is as inspired by evolution: the development449
of intelligence should be guiding our investigations into the modelling of the mind, not vice. versa.450
Questions still remain, though, as to whether AI research should take the same path as evolution451
(Brooks believes so; many critics disagree) and whether we have the epistemological knowledge452
necessary to learn from evolution in developing artificial intelligence.453
A major test for behaviour-based robotics could be how it can be used to demonstrate wider or454
more general intelligence, particularly in comparison to more traditional methods. Brooks pointed out455
in 1991 that, as for traditional methods, behaviour-based AI should be allowed time to develop. On456
the criticism of behaviour-based robotics on the grounds that it cannot solve all tasks considered, he457
likens this to saying that an elephant has no cognitive processes worthy of study because it is unable to458
play chess11 [8]. After nearly thirty years of research, however, the behaviour-based approach shows459
no signs of becoming the dominant paradigm in AI research. This is not to say that it is impossible for460
behaviour-based robotics to reach their intended goal of developing highly intelligent robots; but to461
date we have not yet seen the full scope of Brooks’ visions for AI robotics being realised.462
The issue of scaling up to larger domains and more complex behaviour did in fact lead Brooks463
to revise his ideas in some ways [26]. For example he has had to relax his emphasis on pure reactive464
behaviour and allow that keeping some memory of previous experiences is necessary for higher level465
cognition. For example, his robot Toto learns about its environment by building maps of the parts of the466
environment already encountered in exploration. Brooks maintained that this is not a representation of467
the environment as it does not try to replicate the environment internally but instead recalls the sonar468
readings and actions made by the robot to manoeuvre around obstacles and walls. As said above,469
though, this argument is open to some debate.470
11 Brooks refers to the inability of elephants to understand the game of chess rather than the rather obvious physical difficulties
they would have in picking up the pieces.
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6. Brooks’ impact and views on subsequent artificial intelligence research471
6.1. Behaviour-based robotics after Intelligence Without Representation472
The key area influenced by Brooks’ ideas has been in robotics, where behaviour-based robotics473
is now an accepted component of robotic architecture [14,29,30,38,39]. One key example of the474
application of behaviour-based robotics is in Nasa’s Mars Exploration Rovers [40], robots which475
operate autonomously on the surface of Mars, using behaviour-based principles. Behaviour-based476
robotics research such as [41–43] forms a small but recognised part of the broader field of evolutionary477
robotics [44]. It also sits within Artificial Life and adaptive behaviour research [45–47, e.g.]. Brooks478
continues to contribute to these areas [48, e.g.], though he has recently remarked that their progress479
has ‘stalled’ [49].480
Brooks-style ideas have also had wider impact. Alan Bundy is a strong logical AI exponent,481
however he and Fiona McNeil have written that:482
“automatic representation development, evolution, and repair must be a major goal of483
AI research over the next 50 years.” [50, p. 85]484
[and]485
“Reasoning systems must be able to develop, evolve, and repair their underlying486
representations as well as reason with them. The world changes too fast and too radically487
to rely on humans to patch the representations.” [50, p. 86]488
In other words, there is some acknowledgement that syntax, semantics and pragmatics of489
representations should be evolved discoverable rather than explicitly coded. This is happening490
to some extent in current robotics research such as [33], as well as more broadly in work applying491
evolutionary computation approaches, such as in computational creativity applications [51]. Such492
advances are exemplar of the far-reaching impact of evolutionary or biologically-inspired modelling493
of the mind, and the acknowledgement of the need to consider problems with traditional AI’s use of494
representations.495
Etzioni suggested in his direct response to Intelligence without Representation that Brooks’s proposals496
would also work equally well for “soft-bots” in a real-time software environment (designed externally497
and outside of the control of the soft-bots’ designers: for example the World Wide Web) [35]. In498
other words, physical embodiment is not necessary for demonstrating intelligent cognitive processes.499
Although Brooks has been dismissive of soft-bots in favour of “physical robots made of metal” [14], it500
is uncontroversial to assume that virtual agents can demonstrate intelligence in a virtual environment501
just as physical robots do in a real-world environment [52,53, e.g.].502
Looking back at further direct responses to [1], Nilsson included Brooks’ work in his review of AI503
research [36]. He presented a similar thesis to Brooks, that AI research has become over-specialised,504
and praised Brooks’ work as a step in the right direction but criticised Brooks’ approach as being505
overly focused on low-level processes, acknowledging the existence of doubts about “the long-range506
potential for this work”[36, p. 14].507
Nilsson’s conclusion was that research activity in AI to date (including Brooks’ work) should508
be considered merely as development of tools to be used in the future by systems that display more509
general intelligence. Such hybrid approaches to AI have produced strong results in robotics research.510
For example Brooks describes how the Mars exploration unit Pathfinder takes Brooks’ architecture as511
low level processing of information, with a classical AI-based representation of cognition at a higher512
level of processing. This layered model bears strong resemblance to the general perception of our513
minds as having higher level cognitive processes such as for playing chess, and lower level processes514
such as reacting to unstable ground when walking. The successes demonstrated with this approach515
are at least in part due to how different approaches to cognition apply on wider scales:516
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“[The hope of Traditional AI] is that the ideas used will generalize to robust behavior in517
more complex domains. ... [The hope of Nouvelle AI] is that the ideas used will generalize518
to more sophisticated tasks.519
Thus the two approaches appear somewhat complementary. It is worth addressing the520
question of whether more power may be gotten by combining the two approaches.”12 [8]521
Clark made a similar point:522
“As tasks become more representation-hungry - more concerned with the distal, abstract and523
non-existent - we will see more and more evidence of some kinds of internal representation524
and inner models.” [34, p. 349]525
Brooks has inspired research both within the field of robotics [30, e.g.] and more broadly, within526
cognitive theory [54]. Brooks’ theories have contributed to research areas such as [26] Artificial Life527
(where emergent behaviour is a fundamental demonstration of intelligence) [25, e.g.] and adaptive528
behaviour approaches [55, e.g.]. His ideas sat alongside related contemporary research movements529
such as the animat approach (where the initial intelligent system start with simple behaviour and530
gradually the complexity of intelligence is built up, mimicking how life on Earth has evolved) [56],531
and Braitenburg’s Vehicles [57], which similarly evolved complex behaviour from simple principles532
and has inspired fields such as swarm intelligence [58, e.g.]. Overall, the growth of evolutionary and533
adaptive approaches to AI e.g. [44,45,59, e.g.] has contributed to a broader perspective on AI beyond534
traditional AI and connectionism.535
Brooks’ advancement in academic circles to the post of Director of the Computer Science and536
Artificial Intelligence Laboratory at MIT shows how his work was taken seriously in academia. He537
has received various accolades, including the prestigious IJCAI Computers and Thought Award in 1991,538
presented to “outstanding young scientists in artificial intelligence”.13 The title of this award is539
interesting given Brooks’ critique of the metaphor of computation in cognition. In response, Brooks540
reflected [16] that “Computers and Thought are the two categories that together define Artificial541
Intelligence as a discipline. It is generally accepted that work in Artificial Intelligence over the last542
thirty years has had a strong influence on aspects of computer architectures. In this paper we also543
make the converse claim; that the state of computer architecture has been a strong influence on our544
models of thought.”545
His 2002 book Flash and Machines [60], aimed at non-academics as well as academics, shows the546
extent to which Brooks’ behaviour-based research has progressed his views. In this book, Brooks stated547
that humans are intelligent machines (biological machines, but machines nonetheless):548
“I believe myself and my children all to be mere machines. But this is not how I treat them. I549
treat them in a very special way, and I interact with them on an entirely different level ... I550
maintain two sets of inconsistent beliefs and act on each of them in different circumstances.551
It is this transcendence between belief systems that I think will be what enables mankind to552
ultimately accept robots as emotional machines.”[60]553
To date, Brooks continues to advocate behaviour-based robotics and the principles behind554
Intelligence Without Representation. In 2008 he moved to industry, starting up Rethink Robotics 14555
as CTO, while still retaining some presence in academia as emeritus professor at MIT. He was part of556
the panel behind the 2016 ‘One Hundred Year Study on Artificial Intelligence (AI100)’ Stanford report557
12 Although Brooks later goes on to say that it is best to use his approach on its own rather than in combination with other AI
approaches [14]
13 https://www.ijcai.org/awards, last accessed June 2020.
14 http://rethink.ai
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[61]. At Rethink Robotics, Brooks has recorded several patents since 2012 that employ behaviour-based558
robotics commercially.15559
6.2. Brooks’ views on other areas in current AI research560
What of Brooks’ views comments on other areas of AI research today?561
Brooks has expressed vocal opinions on various other topics in modern day AI research. For562
example, one way in which autonomous robotics research has entered modern-day consciousness with563
the move towards self-driving cars. While he has confidence in the technicalities of self-driving cars564
being realised, Brooks has voiced concerns about how people’s behaviour will have negative effects565
on the pace of technical development. In an ironic twist, he sees that human behaviour will evolve to566
hinder robotic developments [37].567
Machine learning is a currently popular area of Artificial Intelligence that heavily relies upon568
statistical representations. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Brooks has shown negativity towards this style of569
approach, issuing a scathing attack in his blog:570
“In 1991 I wrote a long ... paper16 on the history of Artificial Intelligence and how it571
had been shaped by certain key ideas. In the final paragraphs of that paper I lamented572
that there was a bandwagon effect in Artificial Intelligence Research, and said that “[m]any573
lines of research have become goals of pursuit in their own right, with little recall of the574
reasons for pursuing those lines”.575
“I think we are in that same position today in regard to Machine Learning. The papers in576
conferences fall into two categories. One is mathematical results showing that yet another577
slight variation of a technique is optimal under some carefully constrained definition of578
optimality. A second type of paper takes a well know learning algorithm, and some new579
problem area, designs the mapping from the problem to a data representation ... and show580
the results of how well that problem area can be learned.581
“This would all be admirable if our Machine Learning ecosystem covered even a tiny582
portion of the capabilities of human learning. It does not. And, I see no alternate evidence583
of admirability.584
“Instead I see a bandwagon today, where vast numbers of new recruits to AI/ML have585
jumped aboard after recent successes of Machine Learning, and are running with particular586
versions of it as fast as they can. They have neither any understanding of how their tiny587
little narrow technical field fits into a bigger picture of intelligent systems, nor do they care.588
They think that the current little hype niche is all that matters, are blind to its limitations,589
and are uninterested in deeper questions.” [Postscript to [65]]590
Brooks has also expressed scepticism over deep learning, an area of Artificial Intelligence currently591
strongly in favour and gaining large traction. In a 2012 Nature comment, Brooks warned that:592
“we are in an intellectual cul-de-sac, in which we model brains and computers on each other,593
and so prevent ourselves from having deep insights that would come with new models.”594
[66]595
This reads partly as an unspoken attack on the then-emerging area of deep learning. Deep learning596
relies heavily on multi-level (‘deep’) representations, often based around neural networks.597
Brooks is not alone in his concern over the specificity of current machine-learning-focussed598
approaches to AI, and a lack of adaptability in AI applications to date. For example, as expressed in599
2019 by Judea Pearl:600
15 e.g. patents [62] granted 2019, [63] granted 2016, [64] granted 2015.
16 The paper that Brooks refers here to is [16]
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“The dramatic success in machine learning has led to an explosion of artificial601
intelligence (AI) applications and increasing expectations for autonomous systems that602
exhibit human-level intelligence. These expectations have, however, met with fundamental603
obstacles that cut across many application areas. One such obstacle is adaptability, or604
robustness. Machine learning researchers have noted current systems lack the ability to605
recognize or react to new circumstances they have not been specifically programmed or606
trained for.” [67]607
Brooks invests more faith in artificial general intelligence (AGI), though he warns that in his608
opinion, progress in the area of AGI is lacking at present [68]. AGI research investigates how AI609
can operate with general intelligence that can apply across multiple domains or tasks, rather than610
intelligence focused on specific tasks or domains. This is certainly an area where one can see the611
principles behind Intelligence without Representation contributing [69, e.g.], though it is not the case that612
AGI thus far has required a behaviour-based approach [70,71, e.g.].613
In 2018, Brooks made several predictions for various aspects of artificial intelligence [72]. These614
include several attacks on deep learning, concluding that by 2027 we will reach the end of “the era of615
Deep Learning” and the “[e]mergence of the generally agreed upon “next big thing” in AI beyond616
deep learning.” In contrast, he sees developments in self-driving cars and other robotics continuing617
over future decades. He is appraising these predictions annually; only time will tell as to how correct618
his predictions are.619
7. Concluding remarks620
As noted above, the goal of artificial intelligence prior to Intelligence without Representation [1]621
was to replicate human intelligence in a computational system [5,7,8]. Taking a modern and widely622
cited definition of artificial intelligence, Russell and Norvig define AI as “the designing and building623
of intelligent agents that receive percepts from the environment and take actions that affect the624
environment” [73]. This definitional shift is a sign that, even if Brooks’ ideas are not directly responsible625
for the change, they are part of a broadening in how artificial intelligence is conceptualised.626
Brooks is an elegant writer with a clear and well-presented style, put forward in a persuasive627
manner. His views have gained significant traction. The evolution of the human mind has been628
taking place over an extremely large time-scale. Given our current lack of a complete and agreed629
understanding of what intelligence is and how our mind works, should we be aiming so high in630
building computerised intelligent systems to display human-level intelligence? The principles of631
Occam’s razor (where a parsimonious and simple approach is favoured where possible) is often of632
use in furthering academic progress. This has been demonstrated in countless examples, from the633
preference of Copernicus’ simpler planetary model over the convoluted Ptolemaic system, to heuristics634
for good practice in medical diagnosis. So Brooks’ simple, ‘bottom-up’ approach could be considered635
as the practice of good scientific method. Perhaps a simpler approach is needed.636
But has Brooks discovered a definitive method of explaining and modelling the mind? Brooks’s637
work showed impressive results at first. But, as the sophistication of the robots has increased and638
their behaviour has become more complex, development has slowed in pace somewhat. But this is639
reminiscent of the pattern of development of traditional or ‘good old fashioned’ AI. As noted above,640
Brooks now predicts that the currently popular AI approach of deep learning will follow a similar641
pattern [72].642
Perhaps Brooks himself best summarises the situation between the competing paradigms in AI.643
Although written in 1990, this observation still holds:644
“Can there be a theoretical analysis to decide whether one organization for intelligence is645
better than another? Perhaps, but I think we are so far away in understanding the correct646
way of formalizing the dynamics of interaction with the environment that no such theoretical647
results will be forthcoming in the near term.” [8, p. 13]648
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All is not doom and gloom, though, for AI research:649
“We have only just begun to explore the space of computational possibilities [for modelling650
our minds]. Changes of direction, and even the occasional dead end, should not be scorned651
as folly. Science grows not only by conjectures, but also by refutations.” [26, p. 9]652
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